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I. INTRODUCTION
Gay rights advocates have spent a generation seeking political advances
for sexual minorities-yet now find themselves arguing that gay men, lesbi-
ans, and bisexuals are "politically powerless." During the same time period,
traditionalists have sought to block gay power-yet now say that "homosexu-
als" are political powerhouses. How did this paradoxical debate come about?
It all derives from the politics of constitutional litigation, especially the same-
sex marnage cases.
An emerging issue in the same-sex marriage litigation is whether sexual
orientation is a "suspect classification" requiring strict scrutiny under the fed-
eral Equal Protection Clause or equivalent provisions in state constitutions.
The constitutional fate of state and federal laws excluding gay couples from
civil marriage, and the rights and responsibilities attached to it, may hinge on
the answer to that question.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court memorably held that there
was not a rational basis for state exclusion of gay couples from civil marriage;
however, most judges do not believe that opposition to marriage equality is
completely irrational.1 Hence, advocates for marriage equality almost in-
variably seek a reason for judges to apply heightened scrutiny. The California
Supreme Court recently applied strict scrutiny because exclusion of gay cou-
ples from the institution of marriage violated those couples' fundamental
"right to marry," but this, too, remains the minority position.
Another avenue to heightened scrutiny is when the state exclusion relies
on a suspect classification, namely, sexual orientation. Under federal and
most state constitutional law, the government cannot rely on suspect classifi-
cations, like race, unless it can show a compelling public interest that requires
* John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. This article was delivered as the
2010 Foulston Siefkin Lecture at the Washburn University School of Law. To watch or listen to the presen-
tation, visit http://washburnlaw.edulwlj/foulston/20 10/index.php.
1. Goodridge v. Dep't Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 941, 1004 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting).
2. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384. 426 (Cal. 2008) (relying on the fundamental right to marry to
invalidate legislation that prohibited the recognition of same-sex marriages). I believe this is a good argu-
ment for same-sex marriage. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996).
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such classification. 3
Defenders of "traditional marriage," between one man and one woman,
sometimes maintain that the exclusion of gay couples from civil marriage is
not a "sexual orientation" classification. 4 Their better argument is that sexual
orientation is not a suspect classification, like race, or a quasi-suspect one,
like gender. It is difficult for these defenders to dispute the core claim that
sexual orientation traditionally has been deployed by state actors to imple-
ment anti-gay prejudices and not to advance legitimate public policies. In-
stead, the defenders of traditional marriage usually argue for two additional
requirements for suspect, or quasi-suspect, classification status: the trait that is
the basis for the classification must be immutable, and the group harmed by
the classification must be politically powerless to remedy their harm through
the normal political process.
Deferring to other scholars for analysis of the immutability argument,
this Article will analyze the political powerlessness argument. Part II will lay
out the intellectual and political background of the argument. Part III will
demonstrate, through a close analysis of U.S. Supreme Court equal protection
precedent, that political powerlessness is neither necessary nor sufficient for a
classification to meet the Court's requirement for heightened scrutiny. To the
contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court will not announce heightened scrutiny to
protect a totally powerless minority group against pervasive discrimination.
Part IV argues that, as a normative matter, political powerlessness ought not
play a critical role in equal protection doctrine. Indeed, the most sensible un-
derstanding of equal protection law would urge courts to exercise the utmost
caution in equal protection cases and not apply strict scrutiny until the disad-
vantaged group has become an accepted part of the pluralist process.
II. HISTORY: EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS AS A
CONSIDERATION IN EQUAL PROTECTION LEVEL-OF-SCRUTINY CASES
The idea that minorities need protection from tyrannical majorities has
been part of America's constitutional tradition from the beginning. Among
the general goals of the Constitution of 1789, as immediately amended by the
Bill of Rights, was protection of property-owning and religious minorities
against oppressive measures sponsored by temporary "factions."5 In the nine-
teenth century, state and federal constitutionalism developed the principle that
3. Both federal and state courts have recognized "quasi-suspect" classifications that also require
heightened scrutiny. Infra notes 30, 55.
4. E.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 465 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting). Even if Justice
Baxter were correct that the exclusion of same-sex couples is not a sexual orientation classification, then it
would be a sex-based classification subject to heightened scrutiny under the federal and virtually all state
constitutions. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN LAW 54-67 (2002).
5. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (arguing for republican governance as a bul-
wark against oppression of minorities by "factions"); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting the "free
exercise" rights of religious minorities and barring the "establishment" of a majority faith).
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the government was not authorized to adopt "class legislation," namely,
measures that penalize or tax one social group simply to benefit another.
A key goal of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to provide authority for both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court to at-
tack class legislation at the state level. The Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion, which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, opened its Report to Con-
gress stating: "This deep-seated prejudice against color . . . leads to acts of
cruelty, oppression, and murder, which the local authorities are at no pains to
prevent or punish." During the ratification debates, supporters of the Four-
teenth Amendment repeatedly announced that a central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause was to attack class legislation-especially laws adopted by
southern legislatures to marginalize the new citizens of color.8
The Equal Protection Clause's twin focus on class legislation and laws
oppressing citizens of color may be read to reflect the precept that the U.S.
Supreme Court should be especially scrutinizing of state laws harming citi-
zens of color-and perhaps other groups-who were disabled by violence and
other forms of coercion from protecting themselves in the state and local po-
litical processes. In The Slaughter-House Cases,9 the Court refused to apply
the Equal Protection Clause to an economic monopoly claim, reasoning that
"[t]he existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes
resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as
a class, was the evil to be remedied" by the amendment.' 0 The Court applied
this dictum to strike down a law barring people of color from jury service in
Strauder v. West Virginia."l The law not only imposed a disability on citi-
zens of color but also seemed to be creating a social caste of citizens effec-
tively excluded from public life, including the political process. The Court
understood the role of the federal courts as policing laws whose race-based
classifications rendered state processes a mechanism for the play of social
prejudices to assure the continued subordination of a historically disadvan-
taged class. 12 The Court extended this understanding of equal protection to
the operation of a facially neutral ordinance applied to deny Chinese people
permits to operate laundries in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.13 The Court warned that
equal protection could be violated by administrative implementation of ra-
6. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV.
245, 285-93 (1997).
7. H.R. J. COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION REP. NO. 39-30, at xvii (1st Sess. 1866).
8. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 96-100 (1988); Saunders, supra note 6, at 285-93.
9. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The plaintiffs in The Slaughter-House Cases claimed that a state statute that
forbade slaughtering of animals within the city limits for the protection of the public health was unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 59. The Court found that the state legitimately used its police power in enacting the statute, and
thus it was constitutional. Id. at 81.
10. Id
11. 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880).
12. See id. at 310-11 (stating that courts have express authority to ensure that congressional legislation
observes the rights and immunities provided in the Fourteenth Amendment).
13. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
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cially neutral laws when administered in a way that cannot be explained "ex-
cept [b ] hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners be-
long."'
For the next two generations, the U.S. Supreme Court essentially aban-
doned the Equal Protection Clause as a basis for protecting racial minorities
who were excluded from any meaningful participation in the political process
and who were at the mercy of political systems dominated by white racists.
The New Deal Court, dominated by Justices appointed by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt, revived interest in the Equal Protection Clause as a mechanism
for protecting racial minorities. Americans in that era considered our country
an exemplar of democracy and freedom, in contrast to the totalitarian Com-
munists and Nazis. This self-image was incompatible with apartheid, which
was undemocratic, unfree, and racist, effectively a mirror image of what we
despised about the Nazis.15 The New Deal Justices were sensitive to this ten-
sion and resolved to set the Constitution against apartheid but without engag-
ing in the same kind of undemocratic judicial activism that had characterized
the Lochner era that the same Justices were renouncing.16
A tentative statement of the New Deal Court's philosophy came in foot-
note 4 of the Court's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 17
Consistent with the Court's renunciation of an activist role in reviewing social
and economic legislation, the Court upheld a law regulating the sale of filled
milk. In the footnote, the Court warned that such a deferential attitude would
not necessarily apply to judicial review of laws "directed at particular reli-
gious ... or national ... or racial minorities."18 The Court further wondered
"whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities," and therefore jus-
tifying "more searching judicial inquiry." 19 The Court applied the Carolene
Products dictum in Skinner v. Oklahoma20 and used the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down a sterilization statute that exempted white-collar crimi-
nals from its penalty.21
One can read the Carolene Products dictum and Skinner for the proposi-
tion that laws discriminating against racial minorities unable to protect them-
14. Id. at 374.
15. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
16. For documentation of these concerns by individual New Deal Justices, see David M. Bixby, The
Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90
YALE L.J. 741, 743-45 (1981). The Lochner era, roughly 1905-37, was a period when the U.S. Supreme
Court aggressively reviewed economic legislation that limited the "freedom of contract" supported by busi-
ness interests.
17. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
18. Id.
19. Id
20. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
21. Id. at 543; see VICTORIA NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR
TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 148-50 (2008).
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selves in local political processes should receive serious judicial scrutiny de-
manding a close connection between the discrimination and a legitimate pub-
lic interest. Indeed, this synthesis of the origins, history, and a democracy-
sensitive theory of the Equal Protection Clause is an excellent justification for
Brown v. Board of Education, the Court's most famous equal protection deci-
sion.22 Although written as a statement of the fundamental right to public
education, Brown and subsequent decisions striking down de jure racial seg-
regation in other venues could be justified on substantive grounds (racial
prejudice is an irrational state policy) or on democracy grounds (disadvan-
tages to minorities unable to protect themselves in local political processes) or
on both grounds.23 In Loving v. Virginia,24 the Court formalized the Brown
line of cases, holding that race is a suspect classification that can be deployed
25
by the state only when necessary to serve compelling state interests.
After Loving, other groups sought to persuade the Justices that their de-
fining traits also should be understood as suspect classifications. The form of
the argument was usually this: like people of color, our group has suffered
from pervasive state discrimination founded on prejudice and unfair stereo-
types; like race, our stigmatizing trait is not one whose deployment usually
contributes to the public good; and like racial minorities, our group is not po-
liticallK powerful enough to resist or repeal these unjust discriminatory
laws.2 This represented a concept that focused on harm, irrationality, and
lack of a political remedy as the classic instance when equal protection analy-
sis by judges ought to be particularly scrutinizing.
The American Civil Liberties Union's Women's Rights Project, led by
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, made precisely these arguments in its successful cam-
paign to invalidate laws classifying by gender. A plurality of the Court in
Frontiero v. Richardson27 maintained that gender is a suspect classification
for Ginsburg's reasons. In the case, Justice Brennan's opinion recounted the
long history of state discrimination against women, the irrationality of that
discrimination, and, "perhaps most conspicuously," discrimination against
women "in the political arena.,,28 However, Justice Brennan later wrote a
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. E.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV.
747, 788-819 (1991); see, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
affg 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) (affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision that a municipal corporation's re-
fusal to make the facilities of a public park available to Negro citizens was a violation of equal protection);
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affg 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (ruling that ordinances for
segregation on motor buses was a violation of due process); Mayor & City Council of Balt. City v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955), aff'g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (holding it was unconstitutional for the city to en-
force racial segregation at public beaches).
24. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
25. Id. at 11.
26. For the classic exposition of "like race" arguments for strict scrutiny, see Serena Mayeri, Constitu-
tional Choices: Legal Feminism, and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CALF. L. REV. 755 (2004) (ar-
ticulating feminists' argument that gender is like race).
27. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
28. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Other Justices concurred in the plurality's result without
reaching the suspect classification issue. Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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majority opinion in Craig v. Boren29 that recognized gender as a quasi-
suspect classification and neither acknowledged nor renounced the political
representation analysis. 30
Echoes of the Carolene Products dictum were important in the Court's
other equal protection cases of the 1970s. In Graham v. Richardson,3 1 the
Court ruled that state laws discriminating against aliens should be subject to
strict scrutiny. Citing Carolene Products, the Court reasoned: "Aliens as a
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 32
In most cases, the Court declined to recognize new suspect or quasi-
suspect classifications, and when it did so, the Court sometimes mentioned the
possibility of remediation within the political process. In San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 3 a school funding case, the Court held
that "residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other
districts" did not qualify the alleged discrimination as relying on a suspect
classification. Justice Powell's majority opinion contrasted this "large, di-
verse, and amorphous class" not entitled to strict scrutiny with one entitled to
strict scrutiny, because protected members are "saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process." 35 Rodriguez was the first
U.S. Supreme Court case to use the term "political powerlessness" of the af-
fected group as a consideration of whether a classification is suspect. 36 Fol-
lowing and quoting this language from Rodriguez, the Court in Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia 7 ruled that age-based classifications are not
suspect, in part because all of us look forward to old age; hence, there is no
need for the "extraordinary protection" of heightened judicial review.38
In a grand elaboration of Carolene Products and a comprehensive de-
fense of the Warren Court's equal protection jurisprudence, Dean John Hart
Ely published Democracy and Distrust in 1980. Exactly as the Carolene
Products Court recognized, aggressive judicial review should be the excep-
tion and not the rule-and an exception that is justified when the democratic
political process has broken down in some significant way. What constitutes
29. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
30. Id at 191-210.
31. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
32. Id. at 372.
33. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
34. Id. at 28 (upholding public school funding rules that rewarded rich districts and had significantly
underfunded black and Latino districts).
35. Id. For Justice Powell's own measured skepticism about the Carolene Products notion that judicial
review should correct dysfunctional operations of the political process, see Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene
Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087 (1982).
36. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
37. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
38. Id at 313-14.
39. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw (1980).
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a breakdown in the democratic process that justifies judicial intervention?
Dean Ely said this:
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins
are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in
and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a
vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically dis-
advantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to
recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the
protection afforded other groups by a representative system.
Dean Ely's theory was a brilliant justification for the Warren Court's ag-
gressive judicial review of race-based apartheid in the American South and
provided a principled justification for declining to extend strict equal protec-
tion scrutiny to age and other classifications where the normal political proc-
ess should provide a remedy. This "representation-reinforcing" theory was
inconsistent with most of the Court's gender discrimination cases; however,
Ely maintained that only pre-Nineteenth Amendment gender discriminations
met his test of a malfunctioning democracy. 4 '
Although the Supreme Court did not follow Ely's theory on gender dis-
crimination and other issues explored below, the Elysian framework for equal
protection had, at the very least, rhetorical bite after 1980. In City of Cle-
burne v. Cleburne Living Center,42 the Court ruled that mental disability is
not a suspect classification in part because federal legislation protecting peo-
ple with disabilities against unfair discrimination "negates any claim that the
mentally retarded are politically powerless in the sense that they have no abil-
ity to attract the attention of the lawmakers."
43
The gay rights cases of the last generation have sparked a debate about
the role of political powerlessness in equal protection scrutiny. Scholars con-
cluding that sexual orientation is a suspect classification have followed Ely in
emphasizing that gay people have been subject to pervasive social prejudice
and, as a result, legislatures have not only ignored their interests but demon-
44
ized this group unfairly.
In its first major equal protection case involving gay rights, the Court in
Romer v. Evans invalidated a state constitutional amendment that pre-
empted local ordinances protecting gay people against discrimination. Sug-
gesting the influence of Carolene Products, Justice Kennedy's majority opin-
ion stated that the amendment reflected "animus" against gay people and
therefore had no rational basis. 46  In a hard-hitting dissent, Justice Scalia
40. ELY, supra note 39, at 103. For a more aggressive analysis of Carolene Products, emphasizing the
importance of "prejudice" in the second prong of Ely's theory, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1985).
41. See ELY, supra note 39, at 164-70.
42. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
43. Id. at 445.
44. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999).
45. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
46. Id. at 632, 634-35. The Court expressed concern that the amendments made it much more difficult
for an unpopular minority to secure routine legal protections. See id. at 629-31.
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made his own representation-reinforcing point: "Homosexuals" are not the
kind of defenseless minority that the Court was protecting in the anti-
apartheid cases; "homosexuals" are well-educated, richer than the average
American, concentrated in big cities with great sway over elite opinion, and
therefore they exercise " olitical power much greater than their numbers, both
locally and statewide." Thus, this politically powerful minority should be
left to the normal political process to seek equality rights. Indeed, Justice
Scalia ended his dissent with the complaint that the Court's intervention in the
so-called "culture wars" reflected raw class bias: the elite legal profession's
adherence to gay rights, in contrast to the "plebeian" attitudes of elected legis-
lators who have declined to provide broad equality rights to this excessively
powerful minority.
Justice Scalia continued this theme in Lawrence v. Texas,49 in which he
dissented from the majority's invalidation of Texas' law criminalizing con-
sensual and private "homosexual conduct." Toward the end of his dissenting
opinion, he complained that the majority opinion "is the product of a Court,
which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed onto
the so-called homosexual agenda," and that "homosexuals" have had legisla-
tive successes in repealing sodomy laws and other items on their "agenda.",50
He also warned that the logic of the Court's opinion required the states to rec-
ognize "homosexual marriages." 51 In the wake of Lawrence and Massachu-
setts' recognition of same-sex marriages, lawsuits have been filed in state
courts seeking invalidation of laws excluding gay couples from civil marriage.
Responding to arguments for strict scrutiny of marriage exclusions under
state constitutions, state attorneys general have faced a dilemma. "Like race"
arguments are very strong for gay rights, because the state has pervasively and
intensely discriminated against gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals for a century,
and almost all of the discrimination has been irrational, if not worse. These
assertions are hard to deny, which sets up a prima facie case for suspect, or
quasi-suspect, classification status under both the U.S. Constitution and most
state constitutions. In light of this, state attorneys general have followed three
strategies. First, they argue that same-sex marriage bars are not really sexual
orientation classifications. This is a poor argument. Surely, an exclusion that
affects only gay couples can be considered sexual orientation discrimina-
tion.52 Also, if bars to same-sex marriage are not sexual orientation classifi-
47. Id. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "It is also nothing short of preposterous to call 'politically
unpopular' a group that enjoys enormous influence in American media and politics, and which... though
composing no more than 4% of the population had the support of 46% of the voters on Amendment 2." Id. at
652.
48. Id. at 652-53.
49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
50. Id. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 604-05.
52. Cf Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1883) (treating a nationality-neutral rule for laundry busi-
nesses as ethnicity-based because its operation fell overwhelmingly on businesses run by people of Chinese
ethnicity).
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cations, they are surely gender classifications, and gender is quasi-suspect un-
der federal law and suspect under most state constitutions. 53 Second, defend-
ers of "traditional marriage" often say that a suspect classification must be
immutable and that sexual orientation is a matter of choice. This is a poor ar-
gument as well. As a practical matter, it is not clear that sexual orientation is
a matter of choice-and in any event, sexual orientation is less mutable than
religion and alienage, both of which are suspect classifications.54
The most popular strategy by defenders of "traditional marriage" to the
demand for strict, and presumably fatal, scrutiny of same-sex marriage bars
has been that gay people are not politically powerless, and therefore that sex-
ual orientation should be treated the same as age and disability classifications
were in Murgia and Cleburne. The highest courts of California, Connecticut,
and Iowa have rejected the political powerlessness argument and have ruled
that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. 55  The
highest courts of Maryland and Washington also have rejected arguments that
sexual orientation is a suspect classification, primarily on the ground that sex-
ual minorities are no longer politically powerless; both courts pointed to ordi-
nances and statutes protecting gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from private
and public discrimination.56
Because many states have amended their constitutions to limit civil mar-
riage to one man and one woman, the level-of-scrutiny debate is being pushed
into federal courts. After their supreme court invalidated bars to same-sex
marriage, California voters ratified Proposition 8, which amended their state
constitution to override the court. In 2009, attorneys Ted Olson and David
Boies filed a federal constitutional challenge to Proposition 8 in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger.57 They argue for strict equal protection scrutiny, under U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, both because Proposition 8 denies gay couples a
fundamental right to marry and because it relies on a suspect classification,
namely, sexual orientation. Representing the defenders of Proposition 8,
53. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976).
54. For a thorough analysis of the scientific literature on what "causes" sexual orientation and a dem-
onstration that rights should not turn on immutability, see EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE
SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION (1999).
55. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008) (holding that sexual orientation is a sus-
pect classification); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431-61 (Conn. 2008) (holding that
sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889-96 (Iowa 2009)
(holding that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification); see also Dean v. D.C., 653 A.2d 307, 309
(D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring and dissenting) (concluding that summary judgment was not proper be-
cause gay people may be sufficiently hampered in the political process to fit the political powerlessness prong
of the Supreme Court's criteria for suspect classification).
56. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609-14 (Md. 2007); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963,
974-75 (Wash. 2006). A plurality opinion for the New York Court of Appeals ignored both the immutability
and political powerlessness arguments and rejected strict scrutiny on the ground that sexual orientation is a
relevant trait that the state rationally can take into account for family law purposes. Hernandez v. Robles,
855 N.E.2d 1, 10-11 (N.Y. 2006) (plurality opinion).
57. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (accepting the Olson-Boies arguments and ruling that Propo-
sition 8 is unconstitutional) (appeal pending).
58. For a roadmap of the arguments in Perry, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren Spedale, Who Will
Win the Gay Marriage Trial? A Roadmap to the Routes to Victory for Both Sides, SLATE, Jan. 29, 2010,
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Charles Cooper argues that the fundamental right to marry applies only to
"traditional couples" and that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification.
His main, albeit not only, argument for the latter pro osition is that gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals are not politically powerless. In August 2010, Judge
Walker accepted the Olson-Boies arguments for strict scrutiny and rejected
Cooper's arguments, including his political powerlessness argument.60 Be-
cause this case-or something similar-will reach the U.S. Supreme Court in
the foreseeable future, this is a good occasion to evaluate the cogency of the
argument that political powerlessness is a necessary predicate for suspect, or
quasi-suspect, classifications under the federal Equal Protection Clause and
analogues in state constitutions. Moreover, other social groups, such as trans-
gendered and intersexual people or even polygamists, may encounter the same
political powerlessness argument if they seek judicial recognition that their
identifying trait is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.
III. POSITIVE DOCTRINE: IS A GROUP'S POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS
NECESSARY TO SUPPORT HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
FOR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE GROUP?
The short answer is no.
The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated three requirements for suspect
classifications: (1) the class defined by the classifying trait must be a coherent
social group, (2) the class must have suffered from a history of state discrimi-
nation based upon the classifying trait, and (3) the classifying trait must be a
factor that generally does not contribute to legitimate public policies. In Rod-
riguez, an early statement of the modem analysis, the Court did not consider
the residents of school districts with lower-than-average incomes to be a co-
herent social group, and thus that proposed classification failed the first re-
quirement.61 The Court's other suspect classification cases rise or fall on the
second and third requirements.
As far as I can tell, immutability and political powerlessness never have
made a difference in the Court's ultimate determinations. Thus, the Court has
recognized suspect classifications in cases where the disadvantaged groups
are not politically powerless and, in some instances, where the disadvantaged
groups are political powerhouses. Conversely, as a matter of timing, the
Court almost never recognizes suspect classifications until after the disadvan-
taged group has emerged from political powerlessness. Ultimately, this part
will demonstrate that the political powerlessness argument has it exactly
backwards as a matter of describing the Supreme Court's equal protection
precedents.
http://fray.slate.com/id/2242957/.
59. See id. For updates on Cooper's arguments in defense of Proposition 8 in Perry, see PROTECTMAR-
RIAGE, www.protectmarriage.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).
60. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (appeal pending).
61. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973).
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A. Heightened Scrutiny Turns on the Irrationality
and Squalid History ofLegislative Use of the Classification,
Not the Political Powerlessness of the Class
On the one hand, when the Court has recognized a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification, it has in the large majority of cases ignored the political
powerlessness of the affected class. Race, nationality, and ethnicity are the
classic examples of suspect classifications. Loving v. Virginia-the precedent
formally creating the double standard of strict and rational basis scrutiny-
said not a word about the political power of the Xroup affected by the state
anti-miscegenation law struck down in that case. Instead, the Court relied
on the invidiousness of the classification itself and implicitly upon the
NAACP's showing that miscegenation bans were a legacy not only of apart-
heid but of the slavery era.63 Even after the political powerlessness language
emerged, as early as Rodriguez, the Court's equal protection jurisprudence
continued to justify heightened scrutiny for race-based classifications by ref-
erence to the traditional requirements.
In Palmore v. Sidoti, for example, the Court overturned a Florida
judgment terminating a parent's custody of her child because she was married
to a man of another race. The Court summarily reversed for this simple rea-
son: "Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect ra-
cial prejudice than le itimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dic-
tates the category.',6 Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court said
nothing about the political powerlessness of racial minorities-and indeed
such a statement would have been out of line in 1984. Not only had racial
minorities persuaded Congress, a generation earlier, to adopt the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but by 1984, racial minorities
were benefitting from race-based preferences in federal legislation.66
A decade after Palmore, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena67 that race-based preferences in federal contracting law
68
were subject to the same strict scrutiny dictated by Loving. Justice Stevens'
62. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Loving stated that race-based classifications are "invidious"
and therefore usually not proper bases for state policy. Id. at 10; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (stating that race ought to be "irrele-
vant" to legitimate state policy almost all the time but upholding the race-based curfew in that case).
63. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10-11; Brief for Appellants at 15, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No.
395) (arguing that the miscegenation ban was a legacy of the slavery era and was an irrational, prejudice-
based policy). To the same effect were McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-93 (1964) (striking down
Florida's law barring interracial cohabitation) and Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (striking down
the District of Columbia's law requiring racial segregation in public schools), both of which earlier had held
that racial classifications are "constitutionally suspect."
64. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
65. Id. at 432.
66. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (allowing remedial race-based set-asides in federal
contracting program).
67. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
68. Id. at 221-31 (expanding City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (ap-
plying strict scrutiny to a municipal preference plan based upon race)). I consider Adarand-and not Cro-
son-the key rejection of a political powerlessness requirement for heightened scrutiny, because the race-
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dissenting opinion in Adarand argued that race should not be such a suspect
classification when it was being deployed to remedy harms to racial minori-
ties:
As a matter of constitutional and democratic principle, a decision by representa-
tives of the majority to discriminate against the members of a minority race is
fundamentally different from those same representatives' decision to impose in-
cidental costs on the majority of their constituents in order to provide a benefit
to a disadvantaged minority.
The former, Justice Stevens maintained, is inconsistent with both equal-
ity and democracy, while the latter is entire democratic and worthy of re-
spect by a representation-reinforcing Court. The majority disagreed, how-
ever, and race to this day remains a suspect classification even when it
disadvantages politically powerful majorities. 71  If political powerlessness
was a requirement for strict scrutiny, almost all of these affirmative action
cases were wrongly decided.
Perhaps just as wrong would be the Court's rationale in gender discrimi-
nation cases: women, the class disadvantaged by most gender discriminations,
are not politically powerless, nor are they even a minority. Yet gender has
been a quasi-suspect classification since Craig v. Boren. The plurality opin-
ion in Frontiero remains the Court's leading statement for why gender-based
classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny. Justice Brennan's
opinion emphasized the squalid history of gender-based classifications and
their irrationality. As evidence, Justice Brennan pointed to the fact that Con-
gress overwhelmingly endorsed the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972 and re-
peatedly renounced gender's relevance in workplaces, schools, and public
programs through a series of landmark statutes. Although Justice Brennan
mentioned that women still were discriminated against and underrepresented
in the political arena, his opinion suggested that however "underrepresented"
women were in the halls of Congress, they were far from "politically power-
less" in the 1970s. Moreover, the Court's gender discrimination cases often
involved male plaintiffs who were disadvantaged by gender-based state poli-
cies, such as Oklahoma's rule that eighteen- to twenty-year-old women could
purchase three percent beer but same-aged men could not-the policy struck
down in Craig v. Boren.73 At almost half of the population, and by far the
based plan in Croson was adopted by a city where blacks were arguably the dominant political group; the
statute evaluated in Adarand, by contrast, was adopted by Congress, which was more than ninety percent
white.
69. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 226 (majority opinion). The post-Adarand Court repeatedly has applied strict scrutiny to
evaluate race-based preferences intended to remedy past racial discrimination. E.g., Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
72. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 685, 686-88 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Only Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in dissent, disagreed with Justice Brennan's case for heightened scrutiny; four other Justices
concurred in Brennan's result without reaching this issue.
73. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976).
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wealthier half, men are far from politically powerless. 74
Conversely, when a classification has no systematic history of squalid
deployment and is rational in terms of modem policy, the Court invariably has
denied heightened scrutiny for the classification. Thus, in Lyng v. Castillo,75
the Court ruled that the food stamp program's exclusion of "close relatives"
from households was not subject to strict scrutiny, primarily because that
76
classification has not been applied in an oppressive way in the past. In
Murgia, the Court found that age is not a suspect classification. The primary
reason given by the Court is that age is often a classification the state legiti-
mately wants to consider. Youth is associated reliably with immaturity, and
old age with disability, and courts should defer to legislative judgments as to
precisely how lines might be drawn. In contrast with racial minorities, the
aged "have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or
been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotypical characteris-
tics not truly indicative of their abilities." 77
Cleburne, which classifies mental disabilities, is the leading case that
plausibly can be said to hold that political powerlessness is an essential factor
for strict scrutiny, but analysis of that case suggests a more complicated hold-
ing. Justice White's opinion for the Court explained that race, nationality,
and alienage are suspect classifications triggering heightened judicial scrutiny
because such factors are "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any le-
gitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy . ... For these reasons and because such dis-
crimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws
are subjected to strict scrutiny."7 9  Justice White also noted that gender and
nonmarital birth are quasi-suspect classifications, because both traits " 'bear[]
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.' ,,8o Invoking Mur-
gia, and the language quoted in the previous paragraph, Justice White ob-
served that most classifications are not so consistently irrational that they
81
should be subject to strict scrutiny.
74. One could argue that eighteen to twenty year old men are politically much less powerful than men
as a general category-but even eighteen to twenty year old men are not necessarily "powerless."
75. 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
76. Id. at 638.
77. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
78. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Rodriguez cannot
be read for that proposition, partly because the holding of the case was that the disadvantaged group was too
amorphous and not coherent enough. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Justice Powell's majority opinion contrasted this "large, diverse, and amorphous class" (not entitled to strict
scrutiny) with one whose members are "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraor-
dinary protection from the majoritarian political process" (and therefore entitled to strict scrutiny). Id. at 28
(emphasis added). Even this dictum does not support the notion that political powerlessness is a requirement
for "extraordinary protection," at most, the dictum suggests that it is one of several alternative routes to
heightened scrutiny. Id.
79. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
80. Id. at 440-41 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion)).
81. Id. at 441 (quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313).
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In the next part of his Cleburne opinion, Justice White listed reasons
why mental disability does not fit with race and gender and, therefore, does
not demand heightened scrutiny. First and foremost, people with mental dis-
abilities have a reduced ability to cope with the world and to do various ac-
tivities; the legislature should have wide discretion to decide precisely what
rules should be applicable to people with different capacities. Second, Jus-
tice White noted state and federal laws protecting or assisting the disabled.
These laws demonstrated that legislators "have been addressing their difficul-
ties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corre-
sponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary." Third, the
legislative response "negates any claim that the mentally [disabled] are politi-
cally powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of
the lawmakers." 84
It is not entirely clear how to characterize the holding of Cleburne. In
light of the gender discrimination cases, it probably cannot stand for the
proposition that political powerlessness is a necessary premise-a require-
ment-for heightened scrutiny. In light of the subsequent affirmative action
race cases, Cleburne probably has been overruled on this point if it were read
to support political powerlessness as a requirement of heightened scrutiny. A
more supportable holding of Cleburne is that a classification cannot be sus-
pect if it is often appropriate for legislatures to consider the classification and
legislators often have deployed it in rational ways. This is especially true
when legislators have deployed it to protect the disadvantaged minority, as
through protective laws. This reading reconciles Cleburne with Craig and
Adarand, because divergent Court majorities have concluded that gender and
race are almost never appropriate classifications for legislators to deploy and
that the history of prejudice- or stereotype-based legislation using race and
gender classifications overwhelms the more recent history of anti-
discrimination laws.
B. The Relevant Consideration Is Not Political Powerlessness,
but Is Instead a Sliding Scale ofPolitical Vulnerability Because ofPrejudice
There is another lesson of Cleburne that resonates with the deep history
of the U.S. Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence. Especially if
read in light of previous cases, Cleburne helps explain how the Justices have
understood the "political powerlessness" consideration. To begin with, the
Court's opinion in Cleburne suggests that "political powerlessness" plays
three roles in figuring out which classifications are suspect. Consider the dif-
ferent inquiries:
82. Id. at 442-43.
83. Id. at 443.
84. Id. at 445.
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* Motivation. Are laws disadvantaging this minority ordinarily laws moti-
vated by prejudice or stereotypes, or do they typically reflect impartial judgments
pertaining to good public policy?
* Remediation-Repeal. Can this minority secure the attention of local,
state, and federal legislators to consider repeal or reform of outdated laws dis-
criminating against the minority?
* Remediation-Preemption. Can the minority secure the attention of
Congress to consider national legislation that preempts outdated laws discriminat-
ing against the minority?
In short, the Court is interested in the minority's political salience both at
the time discriminatory laws are enacted and at future times when they can be
repealed.
Moreover, all the inquiries regarding political powerlessness are con-
nected to the Court's concern that prejudice and, especially as illustrated by
the gender discrimination cases, stereotyping infects the political process.
Cleburne echoes the Court's dictum in Carolene Products: "more searching
judicial inquiry" may be justified when "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities ... tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political proc-
esses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.,,85 Prejudice can af-
fect a group's political power in the following ways, from the most to least
egregious:
* Demonization Problems. If there is a great deal of prejudice against a
minority, the majority will tend to scapegoat the minority, with gratuitous legisla-
tion penalizing the minority for harms to which it had not contributed. If a minor-
ity is demonized, the public response often will be punitive or quite dispropor-
tionate to the alleged mischief.
* Segregation/Exclusion Problems. A less severe political disability aris-
ing out of prejudice against a minority is exclusion from ordinary legal institu-
tions, usually without solid reasons. Apartheid had this feature, as have the exclu-
sions of blacks, women, and openly gay people from the armed forces.86
* Pariah Problems. "Pariah" groups are ones that legislators can safely ig-
nore. Often disliked or despised minorities cannot even get the attention of legis-
lators, because their issues are hot potatoes and/or other groups will not form coa-
litions with this minority.
85. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
86. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38
UCLA L. REv. 499 (1991).
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The majority in Cleburne held that people with mental disabilities suf-
fered from none of these political disabilities: legislators did not demonize or
segregate them, nor did disability rights groups have difficulty finding politi-
cal allies; rather than prejudice, the Court found sympathy to be the dominant
trope for people with disabilities in the political process.
Even under this complicated analysis of the role of political powerless-
ness in Cleburne, the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion, read in the context of the
Court's suspect classification case law, still places front and center the
Court's finding that mental disability is a trait that legislators legitimately may
consider when crafting public policy. This is what makes Cleburne like Mur-
gia (age discrimination, no heightened scrutiny) and unlike Craig (gender dis-
crimination, intermediate scrutiny) and unlike Loving and Adarand (race dis-
crimination, strict scrutiny).
The foregoing analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's suspect classifica-
tion case law supports the notion that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification, because (1) the classification defines a coherent social
group that (2) has been subject to pervasive and often vicious discrimination,
and (3) the classification is one that has proven unreliable, indeed counterpro-
ductive, on the merits and is not a legitimate consideration for state policy. 87
To the extent that gay people's lack of "political power" is relevant, it lends
some support to a finding of suspect classification. There can be no doubt
that considerable prejudice against gay people still exists in the United States
and that prejudice affects the political process: proposals to exclude gay peo-
ple from civil marriage remain popular, and gay rights groups remain pariahs
in most of the country. At the federal level, there is a tepid law protecting
gays and other groups against hate crimes, and Congress may enact a job dis-
crimination law protecting sexual minorities in the near future. On the other
hand, a 1993 statute excluded gay people from the armed forces until it was
repealed in late 2010, and a 1996 statute excludes gay couples from the
more than 1,100 provisions of federal law relating to marriage or spouse-
hood.8 9
In short, the case for suspect classification status is much stronger for
sexual orientation than it was for age or mental disability, and it is somewhat
stronger than it was for gender and nonmarital children. The case for more
searching judicial inquiry when legislators deploy sexual orientation classifi-
cations becomes more compelling than gender-based and remedial race-based
87. Admittedly, factor (3) is loaded with normative judgments, but ones that I have supported in detail
elsewhere. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 44, at 13-97 (recounting sad history of gay discrimination with few if
any positive results); see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAW IN
AMERICA, 1861-2003, 73-108 (2008) (recounting in greater detail the anti-homosexual Kulturkampf, from
1946 to 1969, when many lives were ruined and critical social problems left unaddressed because of anti-gay
hysteria).
88. I U.S.C. § 654 (1993).
89. Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
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classifications once political powerlessness arguments are considered.
There is one last point to consider, doctrinally: Can genuine political
powerlessness be a reason not to apply heightened scrutiny? Surprisingly, the
answer is yes.
C. The Court Avoids Heightened Scrutiny for Classifications
When the Class Is Totally Powerless
If a minority group is politically powerless in the deepest sense, the
foregoing analysis suggests that its powerlessness owes something to widely
held prejudices, emotional hatred that others have for the group and its mem-
bers. Deep powerlessness owing to pervasive prejudice means that the minor-
ity will not only be a pariah group that others will shun when forming alli-
ances, but the group also will be subject to exclusions from important state
benefits and institutions and will be demonized and scapegoated. Gay people
in most of the United States today are not totally powerless in this deep
sense-but the were in the period of the anti-homosexual Kulturkampf from
1946 to 1969. Would the case for sexual orientation as a suspect classifica-
tion be a stronger one if it had been brought in 1967, right after Loving v. Vir-
ginia?
It is clear the answer is no. The same year the Warren Court ruled that
race-based classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny, it decided the op-
posite way for sexual orientation, suggesting that sexual orientation minorities
are a suspect group that judges should go out of their way to exclude and pe-
nalize. The issue in Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Service9 1 was
whether a Canadian immigrant should have been excluded, and hence later
deported because he was "afflicted with psychopathic personality" disor-
ders.92 The record in the case revealed that Clive Michael Boutilier was a
man of normal psychological profile, according to unrefuted expert affidavits,
and had enjoyed consensual sex with men and women. The Warren Court
concluded that (1) Boutilier was a "homosexual;" (2) "homosexuals" are af-
flicted, as a matter of law, with "psychopathic personality" disorders, regard-
less of medical expert testimony in an individual case; and therefore (3) it was
lawful for the Immigration and Naturalization Service to deport Boutilier for
that reason.93 Thus, the Court certainly did not treat sexual orientation as a
suspect classification-and instead went out of its way to apply murky statu-
tory language to exclude and penalize a bisexual or gay man.
90. The Kulturkampf Period (1946-1969) was a period when gay people were subjected to imprison-
ment because of their consensual activities, monitored and hunted like dogs by the police, excluded from the
civil service and the armed forces, deported if they were immigrants, and denied licenses and even places to
socialize. See ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 87, at 73-108.
91. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
92. Id. at 118. For further discussion, see Marc Stein, Boutilier and the U.S. Supreme Court's Sexual
Revolution, 23 LAW & HIST. REv. 491 (2005).
93. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 122-23.
94. See id.
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One sad lesson from Boutilier is that if a minority group is totally power-
less, because of social prejudice or pervasive stereotyping, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause will not protect that group.95 The reasons are obvious. If social
prejudice is so pervasive, will not judges themselves be prejudiced, to some
extent, against the minority group? Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black,
leaders of the Warren Court revolution in race and criminal procedure, were
96prejudiced against gay people. It was easy for such judges to believe that
all males who have ever had sex with men were "homosexuals," that "homo-
sexuals" are "psychopaths," and that judges should support state pogroms
against such "psychopathic" people. Even if judges believe a polity is un-
fairly persecuting a decent minority, the judiciary is the weakest branch, and a
broad pronouncement that anti-minority laws all will be subjected to height-
ened scrutiny is one that would trigger a social and political backlash against
the judiciary. Hence, it is safer for judges to provide more targeted protec-
tions, for speech and procedural fairness, and not the wholesale support of
equal protection strict scrutiny.
As Boutilier suggests, the U.S. Supreme Court was hostile to gay people
so long as they really were political pariahs and demons all over America.
Romer v. Evans-decided by a much more "conservative" bunch of Justices
than those who voted in Boutilier or even those who voted in Bowers v.
Hardwick 97  afforded gay people some assurance of equal protection but
only after public opinion had decisively turned away from utter intolerance
and toward a more tolerant, albeit not accepting, view of gay people.98
Although we do not have precise polling data for earlier eras, it is safe to
say that this is roughly the pattern for other groups now protected by the
Equal Protection Clause. During the apartheid era, roughly from Plessy in
1896 to Brown in 1954, most Americans harbored and were unashamed of
their racist prejudices-and the U.S. Supreme Court's equal protection juris-
prudence did virtually nothing to protect people of color against blatant race-
based classifications. Brown was possible only because many whites aban-
doned or grew ashamed of openly racist prejudices. Recall that Brown did not
95. The libertarian First Amendment and the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause should
provide some basic protections, but the Equal Protection Clause will not.
96. See HUGO BLACK, JR., My FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 128 (1975) (Justice Black considered homo-
sexuals to be predatory and best purged from civil society); ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note
87, at 88-108 (Chief Justice Warren, while California governor from 1943 to 1953, led an ambitious anti-
homosexual pogrom in world history that on paper rivaled that of Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945).
97. 470 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
98. The turning point for public opinion apparently was reached in the 1990s, at precisely the point in
time Romer was decided. See Jeni Loftus, America's Liberalization in Attitudes Toward Homosexuality,
1973 to 1998, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 762 (2001).
99. For excellent accounts documenting the parallel civil rights campaigns for social recognition and
legal equality, see DAVID J. GARROw, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BoARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE
ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984). For a
briefer and more popular account, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY
1890-2000 (2001).
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apply strict scrutiny-that did not come until Loving, decided after civil rights
groups had demonstrated their ability to form coalitions and prevail in the po-
litical process through enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965.
Women and people with mental disabilities have had similar experiences
as racial minorities have had. So long as women were totally powerless, in
large part because they did not have the right to vote, the U.S. Supreme Court
was utterly unresponsive to their equal protection claims.100 Indeed, the big
surprise I find in these cases is that the U.S. Supreme Court did not strike
down gender discrimination on constitutional grounds until 1971 in Reed v.
Reed. Decided on the eve of Congress' endorsement of the Equal Rights
Amendment by huge bipartisan margins, Reed and then Frontiero opened the
floodgates of equal protection challenges against gender discrimination.
Likewise, in the era of eugenics, when people with mental disabilities were
considered degraded threats to the survival of the human race, judges as
learned as Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis dismissed equal protection
claims of the disabled as frivolous. 102
The hypothesis that emerges from these cases is that, as a matter of its
own practice, the U.S. Supreme Court will not provide a high level of equal
protection scrutiny when the state is deploying a suspicious classification
against a minority that is totally powerless. Heightened scrutiny will be pos-
sible only once the minority group has shown some political power, albeit not
enough to sweep away all of the encrusted, and irrational or unproductive,
discrimination against its members.lo3 The reason for this phenomenon is
that the U.S. Supreme Court's main focus in determining suspect classifica-
tions is the rationality of the classification, not the ability of the minority to
head off new legislation or repeal existing laws. And, "rationality" is a cul-
tural judgment more than a purely legal one. Race was a "rational" ground
for state policy in a culture where most citizens believed that one race was in-
ferior to the other and hysterically feared racial mixing. Today, one battle be-
tween the conservative and moderate wings of the U.S. Supreme Court con-
cerns whether race ever can be a rational ground even for remedial state
policy. This battle is a substantive debate, involving the correct understand-
ing of what counts as prejudice, what contributes to racial stereotyping, and
what is a good strategy for integrating blacks into the larger society.
100. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (indicating women have no right to vote); Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (deferring to the Illinois legislature's decision to deny women admission to the
Illinois Bar, thus indicating women have no constitutional right to practice law).
101. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
102. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (characterizing equal protection arguments for disabled
people who were sterilized by the state as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments" in a majority
opinion written by Justice Holmes and joined by Justice Brandeis).
103. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law
as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26 (1994).
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IV. NORMATIVE: SHOULD POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS
BE NECESSARY FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY?
There can be little doubt that a theory of suspect classifications including
some kind of political powerlessness requirement for heightened scrutiny is
not consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's equal protection case law. Be-
cause all state constitutions, either as written or as interpreted by states' high-
est courts, have adopted a similarly broad array of classifications subject to
heightened scrutiny, the positive analysis in Part III is applicable to state con-
stitutional analyses as well (such as the analyses in the same-sex marriage
cases). The question remains, however, whether this doctrinal consensus is
right as a normative matter: Should judges find suspect or quasi-suspect clas-
sifications only when the stigmatized minority group is politically powerless?
Consider the nature of constitutional rights, the institutional legitimacy of the
judiciary, and the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. All point in the
same direction: political powerlessness should not be a requirement for strict
scrutiny. That is not to say that this criterion ought to be irrelevant. Political
powerlessness may cast light on the perseverance of prejudice and stereotyp-
ing that harm the minority, and it may be a prudential consideration in the
U.S. Supreme Court's exercise of its power of judicial review when applying
the Equal Protection Clause.
A. The Nature of Constitutional Rights
A political powerlessness requirement for equal protection strict scrutiny
would create a strange kind of constitutional right. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under the analogous provision of
their state constitution, citizens all have a right to the equal protection of state
and municipal laws. Consider the following hypothetical. Citizens A, B, and
C live in Texas. Assume that the State of Texas adopts a law requiring that a
hairdresser be licensed by the state; among the conditions of the license are
that the hairdresser: (1) be trained in an acceptable manner, (2) maintain a
safe and sanitary work environment, and (3) not be a known "homosex-
ual."l04 Citizen A is denied a license because he does not have the requisite
training, and Citizen B is denied a license because Texas regulators conclude
that her facility is not safe and sanitary. Both citizens have a constitutional
right to the equal protection of the state licensing laws, which means they can
demand that the state justify its "discrimination" against them by reference to
a public purpose that their license-denial serves. Because having a state li-
cense is not a fundamental right and the training and sanitary criteria of the
104. The last requirement is not entirely hypothetical. In Texas, a hairdresser's license traditionally has
been contingent on his or her not engaging in "illegal conduct," 1949 Tex. Laws ch. 415, § 1, which in Texas
includes "homosexual conduct" within the home. TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 1994). Although
in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), the Court ruled that the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law
cannot be enforced any longer; the law remains on the books.
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statutory scheme are not suspect classifications, the state's justification is
evaluated according to the rational basis standard, which tolerates a wide
range of regulatory interests and gives the state great leeway in selecting crite-
ria that legislators and administrators think appropriate to the subject matter.
Almost any federal judge would rule that Texas may place these restrictions
on hairdresser licenses, and the equal protection rights of Citizens A and B
have not been violated.
But suppose that Texas denies Citizen C a license because he is an
openly gay man. He has the same constitutional right to demand justification
as Citizens A and B, but may have more success in his equal protection claim
because the state is deploying a fishier classification. Whether he succeeds
probably depends on whether the U.S. Supreme Court or the Texas Supreme
Court considers sexual orientation to be a suspect or quasi-suspect classifica-
tion. In this sense, Citizen C will have more success in pursuing his equal
protection rights than Citizens A and B did, but the applicable doctrinal analy-
sis is the same for all three citizens.
Now assume, further, that "political powerlessness" of the affected
group is a necessary condition for heightened scrutiny. The nature of the
equal protection right changes dramatically for Citizen C. If he is denied a
hairdresser's license in 1943, when gay people were totally powerless in both
Texas and in the United States, he has a strong equal protection claim, be-
cause sexual orientation is more likely to receive strict scrutiny, at least as a
matter of theory. But if he brings the claim in 2010, when gay people are no
longer powerless in either Texas or the United States, he has a weak equal
protection claim, because sexual orientation will not be a suspect classifica-
tion. So, when Citizen C brings suit makes a decisive difference not in the
facts of his case-his own sexual orientation, the state justifications for ex-
cluding him, and the evidence that the state relies on-but rather in the legal
test that the Court would apply to the facts of his case. These circumstances
describe an odd constitutional right.
While it is not unknown for the U.S. Supreme Court to overrule earlier
precedents and thereby change the applicable constitutional analysis over
time, as the Court did in Lawrence v. Texas, it is unprecedented for the Court
to say that the standard of scrutiny changes based on political circumstances
of a group. The oddness of such a constitutional rule is even more apparent if
I change the hypothetical. Let us implausibly speculate that the U.S. Su-
preme Court in 1943 ruled that sexual orientation is a suspect classification,
because (1) sexual minorities are a coherent but politically powerless social
group (2) who have been subjected to pervasive and harmful discrimination
because of their sexual orientation, (3) which is an irrational classification
usually invoked because of prejudice and stereotyping and not good public
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policy.lo5 Can Texas in 2010 add new discriminations against gay people and
argue to the Supreme Court that it should overrule the 1943 decision because
an essential premise-political powerlessness-is no longer true?
Stare decisis may save the 1943 precedent, but then we have the strange
state of affairs that by 2010 the Equal Protection Clause is brigaded with sus-
pect classifications originally adopted to protect powerless social groups-
while those groups, racial minorities, women, gay people, are no longer po-
litically powerless. Can one honestly say, under these circumstances, that po-
litical powerlessness is really a necessary condition for heightened scrutiny?
Under such circumstances, the political powerlessness criterion is, at best, a
screening device used to prevent the Court from overloading the political sys-
tem with suspect classifications. But such a state of affairs raises its own
equal protection concerns: majorities (women) and minorities (blacks, Lati-
nos, and gays [under my hypothetical]) who enjoyed early success in securing
heightened scrutiny get better equality protections than new minorities (lan-
guage minorities and perhaps transgendered people). Is this fair? Is this dis-
crimination in the apportionment of heightened scrutiny among groups a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause?
Consider another variation. Assume that Texas legislators amend the
hairdresser law to deny licenses to openly straight people. Such a law might
pass the rational basis test but certainly would not pass heightened scru-
106tiny. If political powerlessness were a necessary condition for heightened
scrutiny, however, only homosexuality, or perhaps bisexuality, would be a
suspect classification. Heterosexuality should not be such a classification, be-
cause straight people are politically powerful; if enough straight people
wanted to be hairdressers, they could certainly secure the attention of the
Texas Legislature and probably could get the law repealed.
These variations on the hairdresser hypothetical suggest the normative
power of the positive point that dominates Part III: the overriding feature of
equal protection suspect classifications is the irrationality of those classifica-
tions. Are they ordinarily deployed by legislators in ways that serve the pub-
lic interest, or are they usually invoked by legislators seeking to penalize peo-
ple they despise or to pander to local prejudices and stereotypes? If
understood in this way, the equal protection right shared by Citizens A, B, and
C looks like other constitutional protections: everyone enjoys a right not to be
discriminated against because of a personal trait that has no bearing on proper
public policy.
By rejecting a political powerlessness requirement for equal protection
heightened scrutiny, the U.S. Supreme Court will reaffirm the neutrality of
105. The text sets forth a doctrinal framework for suspect classifications that is a modification of the
Rodriguez framework set forth earlier, except that I have added "political powerlessness" is a feature of fac-
tor (1).
106. For example, Texas might argue that gay people are "better" hairdressers. I am not sure this is true,
but it is possible for a rational legislator to accept this.
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equal protection analysis that has been a stable part of the Constitution. The
original framers of the Constitution of 1789 understood that everyone had a
right to be free of "partial" or "factional" laws. 107 Most state constitutions
incorporated that idea in important "common benefits" provisions of their
declarations of rights. As the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 put it: "Gov-
ernment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and
security of the people, nation, or community; and not for the particular
emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or sett [sic] of men, who
are a part only of that community., 08 Note that this original constitutional
understanding not only had no "political powerlessness" requirement but was
antithetical to such a requirement. The idea was that everyone would be
treated the same, subject to criteria serving the common good.
Consistent with this understanding, judges between 1787 and 1868 be-
lieved that "class legislation"-targeting one minority group, often property
owners-is deeply inconsistent with our fundamental rights and hence uncon-
stitutional.109 The Equal Protection Clause did not abandon that commit-
ment-instead, it built on that commitment against class legislation, expanded
to include not only the freed slaves, but also other racial and ethnic groups,
without any significant mention of the political powerlessness of such
groups.110 Today, equality is a bedrock freedom that all Americans take for
granted, and that is a good thing. It is the glue that binds us all together in re-
ciprocal benefits and obligations. Such a reading contributes to the robustness
of our democracy for "there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of
law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed gener-
ally."'1 A reading of equal protection that excludes groups found not to be
politically powerless is strongly inconsistent with this history.
B. The Institutional Interest of the Judiciary
Legal process theorists, from Justice Frankfurter through Professor
Alexander Bickel through Dean Ely, are concerned with the tension between
judicial review by unelected judges and the democratic premises of legisla-
tion.112 Unless a statute clearly violates the Constitution, there is a legitimacy
107. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (structure of the republic will discourage "factional"
laws); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, (Alexander Hamilton) (judicial review will discourage "partial or unjust"
laws). See generally Saunders, supra note 6 (describing the continuous line of case law discouraging "class
legislation" in the early republic).
108. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. 1, § 5 (1776), amended by PA. CONST. of 1790, art. 1, § 2 (1790) and PA.
CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 2 (1838), www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/academics/founders/penn-constitution.pdf.
109. See Saunders, supra note 6, at 247.
110. Excellent surveys of the drafting and ratification debates and their focus on "class legislation" as
the object of the Equal Protection Clause are available. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 8, at 176-78; Saunders,
supra note 6, at 271-93 (describing the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, with a focus
on the anti-class legislation idea).
111. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); accord
Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300-01 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
112. For the connection between "legal process" theories of law (emphasizing comparative institutional
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concern with invalidation by unelected judges. This "countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty" inspired Dean Ely's theory ofjudicial review: given the open-textured
nature of most of the Constitution's core rights, including equal protection,
unelected judges should leave most majoritarian legislation alone and should
only strike down laws that reflect the poor operation of the political process,
which an unelected judiciary is well-situated to monitor the way a referee
monitors a sporting event. One can argue from the representation-
reinforcement premise that heightened equal protection scrutiny should be re-
served for minority groups that are politically powerless-but there are many
problems with such an argument from the institutionalist perspective of legal
process theory that underlies Dean Ely's own theory of judicial review. Thus,
Dean Ely's theory itself should not be read to support a political powerless-
ness requirement.
Recall that Dean Ely's theory is grounded upon the Carolene Products
dictum suggesting that deferential judicial review might not apply to laws "di-
rected at particular religious . . . or national . . .or racial minorities" and that
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities" may justify a "more searching
judicial inquiry.',114 From this part of the Carolene Products dictum, Dean
Ely argues that more searching judicial review is justified when "representa-
tives beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging
some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize
commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection
afforded other groups by a representative system."
115
Neither Carolene Products nor Dean Ely's book suggests that a group
needs to be "politically powerless" for a judge to conclude that the political
process is malfunctioning. Instead, the focus is on the operation of prejudice
to disadvantage the minority unfairly in the political process.116 Indeed, stan-
dard legal process analysis of institutional competence and legitimacy should
press representation-reinforcing theories of judicial review away from the po-
litical powerlessness requirement.
Recall, from Part III, that the U.S. Supreme Court's practice inverts the
demands of the political powerlessness requirement. When a social group is
totally powerless, the Court will not subject the group's stigmatizing trait to
heightened scrutiny. Once the minority has achieved some political power,
competence) and representation-reinforcing theory, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An His-
torical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li to xcvi (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
113. See ELY, supra note 39, at 102-03.
114. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
115. ELY, supra note 39, at 103.
116. That is the primary argument of Ackerman, supra note 40.
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then the Court may intervene with strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
or rational basis with bite.119 The degree of scrutiny the Court will apply is
driven by the Justices' judgment as to whether the classification defining the
group is one that the state may legitimately take into account, or one that typi-
cally reflects prejudice or stereotyping.
It is in the U.S. Supreme Court's institutional self-interest to follow an
approach something like the Court's actual practice-and the gay rights cases
of the last generation illustrate why this is so. If the Court took the political
powerlessness criterion seriously, it would get into hot water much more of-
ten. A political powerlessness requirement, if taken seriously, would encour-
age the Court to enforce over equality rights by generating decisions that
would rile prejudiced majorities before powerless minorities could protect
themselves against harmful backlashes. However fierce the southern backlash
was after Brown, consider how ferocious it would have been if the Court had
decided Brown fifteen years earlier, or if the Court had struck down the thirty
anti-miscegenation laws in place in 1954.120 This kind of thought experiment
need not be hypothetical for gay rights issues. In 1993, a plurality of the Ha-
waii Supreme Court ruled that a same-sex marriage bar is "sex-based dis-
crimination" subject to strict scrutiny; the court remanded the case for trial to
determine whether the state's same-sex marriage bar could be justified under
such heightened scrutiny.121 The reaction was immediate and ferocious. The
mere possibility of gay marriage in the 1990s was enough to fuel a national
anti-gay marriage backlash that is only now abating. In its wake came the un-
precedentedly discriminatory Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 and dozens of
new state statutes and constitutional provisions barring same-sex marriages
and refusing to recognize out-of-state gay marriages. Even tolerant, lib-
eral, multicultural Hawaii saw a strong backlash-and the Supreme Court of
Hawaii beat a hasty retreat in 1998, when it vacated a lower court injunction
and upheld a new law barring gay marriage in that state.123
Here is a lesson of the Hawaii fiasco. When a constitutional court is too
117. For post-Brown race discrimination cases, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2005); Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
118. For a post-Craig gender discrimination case, see Virginia v. United States, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
119. For a pre-Craig gender discrimination case, see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
For a post-Romer sexuality case, see Goodridge v. Dep't ofPub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003),
applying rational basis with bite to strike down state marriage exclusion for gay couples. For a post-Cleburne
disability case, see Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
120. For discussion on the fierce southern backlash to Brown, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF
MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1969); BENJAMIN MUSE,
VIRGINIA'S MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1961), and FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE
(1973).
121. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (Levinson, J., plurality opinion).
122. For the public reaction in Hawaii and the rest of the country, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 22-42 (2002); David Orgon Coolidge,
The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000). For
commentary on the Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C. § 7 (1996), see KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 124-140
(2002).
123. See generally Coolidge, supra note 122 (providing a detailed analysis of the Hawaii Supreme
Court's hasty retreat after a renunciation of same-sex marriage in a 1998 voter initiative).
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far ahead of public opinion on a divisive high-stakes issue-as the political
powerlessness requirement encourages a court to be-then it risks a tremen-
dous popular backlash. If such a backlash occurs, it threatens not only to
undo the court's constitutional ruling, but also to undermine the independence
of the court itself.124
A political powerlessness requirement, if seriously applied, would en-
courage the Court to underenforce equality rights because minorities seeking
entry into the great American melting pot would be frustrated by political
blockages reflecting prejudice, stereotypes, and good old-fashioned inertia.
The requirement would be unfair to minorities. Blacks were politically pow-
erless in the United States of the 1930s, when Carolene Products was de-
cided. But, in the 1930s, racial minorities were not asking the U.S. Supreme
Court to find race to be a suspect classification or to sweep away all race-
based laws. This was not the civil rights agenda until after World War II, at
the very point when racial minorities were securing some political influence at
the national level, illustrated by President Truman's decision to end racial
segregation in the armed forces.125 When Brown was decided in 1954, civil
rights concerns were being addressed by the political process, but there was
more than enough race-based prejudice to deny such citizens effective relief
from the many discriminations against them. If the U.S. Supreme Court
had evaluated and upheld apartheid under the rational basis approach in the
1950s and 1960s based upon a political powerlessness requirement, what ef-
fect would that have had on the nation's race relations? It is impossible to say
for certain, but my bet is that social frustration would have boiled over into
violence much earlier and more intensely than it did in the 1960s.
Consider Lawrence v. Texas. When Texas' Homosexual Conduct Law
was originally adopted in 1973, gay people were politically powerless in the
state-so powerless that almost all gay Texans were in the closet, at least pro-
fessionally. Such a social group will not generate a great deal of political or-
ganizing to start with, and whatever organizations form will concentrate on
the extreme state policies, such as the consensual sodomy law struck down in
127Lawrence. Once gay people were freed from criminal prosecution in a
state like Texas, their political power would increase because gay and bisexu-
als Texans would come out of the closet. At some point, the social group's
legal agenda would include demands that all anti-gay discrimination be termi-
nated-precisely the sort of demand that strict scrutiny is designed to deliver.
124. Even in moderate Iowa, voters reactcd negatively to their supreme court's decision recognizing
same-sex marriages as a state constitutional requirement, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 889 (Iowa 2009).
Three justices who supported marriage equality were voted out of office in 2010, the first time Iowa voters
had done that in more than a generation.
125. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948) (establishing the President's Com-
mittee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services)
126. E.g., ROBERT CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE (2002) (painful
account of the barriers to federal legislation making race discrimination illegal).
127. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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But usually, such demands are not seriously made until the social group al-
ready has achieved a level of tolerance by the body politic. In this way, the
political powerlessness requirement for heightened scrutiny acquires a Catch-
22 feature: equal protection doctrine would offer heightened scrutiny before
the social group is ready to ask for it-but then would deny heightened scru-
tiny when the social group is able to nullify criminal laws placing a brand of
inferiority on group members and, from that, presses an equal protection
agenda. Catch-22s are not necessarily violations of the Constitution-but
they are socially destructive, as I shall argue in Part IV.C.
C. The Pluralist-Protecting Purpose ofEqual Protection
Two questions remain: What is the affirmative constitutional purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause? What positive role should it play in American
governance? Dean Ely's theory suggests that the purpose of equal protection
is to protect the operation of the democratic process, but I have argued that the
more obvious purpose is to protect the orderly emergence and assimilation of
new groups into this country's pluralist democracy. 128 A pluralism-
protecting theory of equal protection is hostile to the political powerlessness
requirement for heightened scrutiny.
A pluralist political system is one whose goal is the accommodation of
the interests of as many salient groups as possible, without disturbing the abil-
ity of the state and the community to press forward with collective pro-
jects.129 In a pluralist democracy, social, economic, and ideological groups
compete for the approval and support of representatives and the electorate.
The polity, in turn, encourages groups to participate in the marketplace of
politics. The twentieth century saw an evolution of American pluralism, re-
sponsive to identity-based social movements. Those movements sought to
change public opinion about norms involving race, gender, sexual orientation,
and disability and worked through the political process to change the law.
But, those movements also reflected a multicultural pluralism, in which an in-
creasing array of groups or subgroups sought to create their own quasi-
autonomous communities within the larger culture. 130
Although the Framers of the Constitution did not anticipate our modem
pluralism, they appreciated that social groups would become disenchanted
with government when the system becomes embroiled in bitter disputes that
frustrate the reasonable expectations of contending social groups. Groups will
disengage when they believe that participation in the system is pointless due
128. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by
Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005).
129. E.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT
(1967); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SC. REv. 734-35 (1983).
130. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIPS (1995); IRIS
MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
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to their permanent defeat on issues important to them or due to their percep-
tion that the process is stacked against them, or when the political process im-
poses fundamental burdens upon them or threatens their group identity or co-
hesion. The Framers intuitively understood a basic precept of stable
democracies: the state must avoid premature resolution of primordial issues
that both evenly and intensely divide the body politic.132 At the founding of
our nation, religion was the classic example of such divisive high-stakes poli-
tics; the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment sought to lower the stakes
of religion-based politics by assuring that no religion would be persecuted nor
would any religion be formally established as the official state faith.133
A major problem for the multicultural-pluralist polity is how to manage
the emergence, conflict, and normative triumph of identity-based social
movements. In the twentieth century, successful movements followed this
pattern: (1) minority group challenges consensus that its distinguishing trait
(color, sex, sexuality) is a malignant variation from the norm; (2) society re-
vises consensus to allow that the minority trait is a tolerable variation but not
as good as the norm (whiteness, maleness, heterosexuality), which encourages
the minority to insist on full equality; finally, (3) society revises consensus to
recognize that the minority trait is a benign variation and that there is no sin-
134gle norm. Traditionalists resist these claims; for some, adherence to tradi-
tional status entitlements itself becomes central to their identities.
At each stage, the stakes of politics will threaten to get too high. The
stakes are raised, however, in different ways during each stage.135 In Stage
One, when a new group is emerging, the status quo will tend to suppress its
message, disrupt its political mobilization, and perhaps attack its members
through criminal laws. These are problems of insider lock-ins. In Stage Two,
if the new group achieves a foothold in the political process, it will engage in
intense, perhaps furious, debates with empowered groups over what the pre-
vailing social norm should be. These are culture war difficulties. In Stage
Three, if the new group persuades Americans that its members deserve
(roughly) equal treatment, then it faces the difficult process of weeding out
legal discriminations entrenched in the prior era. These are frictions arising
from obsolete laws.
According to Adam Przeworski, "Constitutions that are observed and
131. My discussion of high-stakes politics, and its alienating effect on social groups, draws from ADAM
PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE
AND LATIN AMERICA 36-37 (1991).
132. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 93-99 (1956) (arguing that a stable
democracy requires that issues both evenly and intensely dividing society must not be decided prematurely,
for that would alienate a significant social group and prove destabilizing).
133. Cf STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 202-
08, 222-27 (1995) (interpreting the Religion Clauses as an exemplar of governance meta-policies along the
lines of "gag rules" to keep combustible issues off the public agenda).
134. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2069-72 (2002) (setting forth a detailed account of
the interaction between emerging social movements, old majorities, and constitutional adjudications).
135. The analysis in this paragraph is taken from Eskridge, supra note 44.
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last for a long time are those that reduce the stakes of political battles."'1
36
Such constitutions "define the scope of government and establish rules of
competition, leaving substantive outcomes open to the political interplay."1
3 7
Although Przeworski does not apply his insight to judicial review, his theory
cautions that judges easily can raise the stakes of politics through review that
is too aggressive-but often judicial review can have the effect of lowering
the stakes of identity politics. Consider a few illustrations that are relevant to
the political powerlessness requirement analyzed here.
In Stage One, when the emerging minority is despised and politically
powerless, a stakes-lowering theory would say that judicial review should not
recognize the relevant classification as suspect. This would have the effect of
eliminating virtually all of the discriminations against the minority at the point
in time when animus against the minority is widespread-such judicial activ-
ism would stimulate a terrible backlash by the fearful majority. Even under
Dean Ely's theory, judicial review would be more effective, with a much
lower risk of backlash, if it were more targeted and libertarian in Stage
One.138 Enforcing the First Amendment to protect political organizing and
expression against censorship would be a less risky judicial intervention than
would strict equal protection review, and it would probably enable the emerg-
ing minority to object to discrimination against its members, refute stereo-
types, expose prejudices as unfounded, and organize politically.' 3 9
From a pluralism-facilitating point of view, heightened scrutiny for a
minority group's identifying trait should not come until late in Stage Two or,
probably better, in Stage Three, when the minority is a visible and respectable
presence in national politics; in other words, once the minority is no longer
totally powerless politically.140 Although many citizens will continue to har-
bor prejudice against or hold stereotypes about the minority, increasing num-
bers of citizens not identified by the trait will recognize the variation as toler-
able or benign and not relevant to good public policy. Especially if judges are
willing to nudge the political process by chipping away at old discriminations,
legislatures will be more careful before they discriminate and may even repeal
136. PRZEWORSKI, supra note 128, at 36.
137. Id.
138. For an example, drawn from California judges during that state's anti-homosexual Kulturkampf,
see William N. Eskridge, Foreword: The Marriage Cases-Reversing the Burden of Inertia in a Pluralist
Constitutional Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1785, 1789-96 (demonstrating no one in public culture could
even admit that "homosexuals" were entitled to equal treatment, but that far-sighted judges were able to pro-
vide due process and First Amendment protections for sexual minorities during that dark period).
139. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 44, at 145-48 (when "homosexuals" were politically powerless, judges
still protected free press and speech rights, which were more efficacious than premature equality rights would
have been); Richard A. Posner, Ask, Tell, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. I1, 1999, at 52 (agreeing with this point and
urging it as a model for most minorities).
140. As the experience of gay people in California illustrates, judicial protection of minority speech and
organization will help the minority group to refute stereotypes, undermine prejudice, and persuade the major-
ity that its members pose no serious threat to society. See Eskridge, Marriage Cases, supra note 138, at
1796-1802. Of course, whether the minority group is successful depends on the group's ability to persuade
the younger generation that their claims are correct.
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old laws that burden the minority.141 If the body politic's experience with the
increasingly visible and politically active minority is a good one, continuing
discriminations against the minority will become irritants to a growing part of
the body politic, usually younger people who view old discriminatory atti-
tudes as ridiculous, and their demise would be upsetting to a smaller portion
of the general population. It is during late Stage Two or perhaps Stage Three
that judges should sweep away the minority-harming classification. Although
the minority at that point is no longer politically powerless, it still faces bur-
dens in the legislative process, and judicial review can usefully reverse that
burden of inertia, so that discriminatory treatment and not law reform must be
justified. The core reason for aggressive judicial review is that a consensus of
informed opinion has concluded that variation regarding the classification is
actually benign and should not be the basis for government policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The implications of the foregoing analysis for Perry v. Schwarzenegger
are quite clear and disturbing for both sides. Contrary to Charles Cooper and
other defenders of Proposition 8, there is no political powerlessness require-
ment for heightened scrutiny under the federal Equal Protection Clause, nor
should there be. Such a requirement is a woeful misreading of American le-
gal and cultural history, U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and political theory,
and should not be imposed upon the Constitution. On the other hand, and
contrary to Ted Olson and David Boies, a minority still subject to pervasive,
even if declining, social prejudice and stereotyping in large swaths of the
country is not in a good position to seek heightened scrutiny from the U.S.
Supreme Court. Specifically, gay marriage-the last big state discrimination
against sexual minorities-is still too controversial for the U.S. Supreme
Court to impose upon the entire nation as a matter of federal equal protection
law.
This analysis poses a dilemma for the Ninth Circuit, which heard the ap-
peal in Perry. 142 The best resolution would be for the case to be mooted
through California's revocation of Proposition 8 in 2012.143 Failing that, the
Ninth Circuit is in a tough position. As a matter of doctrine, sexual orienta-
tion should be a suspect classification: gay people have been objects of perva-
sive and crippling state discrimination; sexual orientation has no bearing on
people's ability to contribute to society and public projects; and there is no
political powerlessness requirement, but if there were, gay people may qualify
141. E.g., id. at 1798-1800 (describing the California Legislature's repeal of the state's consensual sod-
omy law, so that gay people are not automatic outlaws); id. at 1805-06 (describing the legislature's enact-
ment of anti-discrimination measures, following pioneering court rulings).
142. In early December 2010, the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in Perry. Perry v. Schwarzenegger
Oral Arguments, C-SPAN (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Perryv.
143. Advocates of marriage equality are planning to place the issue on the ballot in California again in
2012. If Proposition 8 were revoked by another initiative, then the Perry case might be mooted.
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at the federal level. But that is the dilemma. Properly understood, because of
widespread prejudice, the political weakness of gay people is what makes it
risky for the Ninth Circuit (which includes Idaho and Montana, culturally
conservative states), and perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court, to sweep away
most or all sexual orientation discriminations.
In my view, the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court should find
some way to duck the suspect classification issue so that it is not resolved na-
tionally.144 Gay marriage is still an issue best left for state-by-state resolution,
much as interracial marriage was until the 1960s. The U.S. Supreme Court
has a number of procedural mechanisms whereby the Justices can leave any
Ninth Circuit disposition in place. The Justices of course can deny review of
the Ninth Circuit's judgment; even if review is granted, a majority can dismiss
the appeal as moot if California voters revoke Proposition 8 in the interim;
and even if the Court were to reach the merits of an appeal, there may be nar-
row grounds for deciding that it does not require the Justices to rule that sex-
ual orientation is a suspect classification.
144 Thus, I have filed an amicus brief in Perry arguing that the district court's opinion can be affirmed
without reaching the suspect classification issue.
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